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Abstract
This paper introduces power default reasoning (PDR), a framework for non-monotonic rea-
soning based on the domain-theoretic idea of modeling default rules with partial-information in
a higher-order setting. PDR lifts a non-monotonic operator at the base (syntactic) level to a
well-behaved, almost monotonic operator in the higher-order space of the Smyth power-domain
—e5ectively a space of sets of models. Working in the model space allows us to prove the
dichotomy theorem and the extension splitting theorem, leading to a more well-behaved logic
and (modulo the usual complexity conjectures) a less complex logic than standard default logic.
Speci8cally, we prove that skeptical normal default inference is a problem complete for co-NP(3)
in the Boolean hierarchy for strict propositional logic and NP(4)-complete in general. These re-
sults (by changing the underlying semantics) contrasts favorably with similar results of Gottlob
(J. Logic Comput. 2(3) (1992) 397–425), who proves that standard skeptical default reasoning
is P2 -complete. Furthermore, we show that the skeptical non-monotonic consequence relation,
de8ned using our domain-theoretic semantics, obeys all of the laws for preferential consequence
relations de8ned by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor. In particular, we get the property of being
able to reason by cases, and the so-called law of cautious monotony. Both of these laws fail for
the standard propositional default logic of Reiter (Arti8cial Intelligence 13 (1980) 81–132), but
hold in PDR as a consequence of the dichotomy theorem and the extension splitting theorem.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Non-monotonic reasoning is a signi8cant research area spanning the arti8cial intelli-
gence community and the community in logic programming and deductive databases.
The term refers to drawing conclusions using “defaults”, or “rules of thumb”, ap-
plied in the presence of incomplete information. Since these rules might be applied in
unanticipated exceptional situations, the conclusions drawn from them might have to be
modi8ed or discarded. This phenomenon is what is commonly called non-monotonicity.
In this paper, we follow the standard practice of ignoring the need to retract in-
correctly drawn conclusions, focusing instead on the use of pseudo-logical inference
rules, and=or “defeasible” conditionals, in order to allow database systems to derive
conclusions or to answer queries in the absence of explicitly stored hard information.
A key problem is to identify what we mean by “absence of information”. This is
where the use of Scott’s domain theory enters the picture, as it is concerned with
the mathematical properties of partial information, typically exhibiting stages in the
computation of a partial function as they evolve under the iteration controlled by a
program. We wondered if the explicitness of the theory of domains would allow us
to identify, model-theoretically, the places where default rule application was taking
place in the absence of hard information. The idea is not original with us—the database
research group at the University of Pennsylvania has pioneered the use of Scott domain
theory as a tool for database query language design. A good overview can be found
in Libkin [15]. In fact, one key idea of our semantics (updating) is taken from this
work.
Domain theory shows us how to model successive stages in the computation of a
partial function (extending its domain of de8nition at each stage) by iterating an opera-
tor F on partial functions which is monotonic: if the partial function f can be extended
to the partial function g, then F(f) can be extended to F(g). A standard theorem says
that the operator F has a least %xpoint: a function f∗ such that F(f∗)=f∗ and such
that any other 8xpoint of F extends f∗. A natural move is to consider non-monotonic
analogs of the least-8xpoint construction. We have found that Reiter’s extension oper-
ator is just such a construction; in fact, one which appropriately generalizes to arbitrary
Scott domains. (The fact that this operator could be a very general one was 8rst noticed
in a paper by Marek et al. [16].)
In Reiter’s system, extensions of a logical theory are obtained with respect to a set
 of defaults of form
P : Q
R
, which are interpreted as proof rules with the informal
interpretation: If P has been proved, and Q is consistent, then infer R. Here P, Q, and R
are ground 8rst-order formulas, with respect to a 8rst-order theory with standard rules
of proof as well as the default rules. In this paper, we focus on normal default rules
of form
P : Q
Q
, which have pleasanter theoretical properties (it will be seen, though,
that we do not stick to the case of 8rst-order logic). More work is needed for general
default rules and it is not clear which parts of our results can be extended to the
general case.
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Let W be a theory (typically, the set of logical consequences of a single formula).
An extension of W is a theory E obtained as follows. Let (W;X ) be the least possible
deductively closed theory (i.e., closed under the standard proof rules) containing W
and closed under application of the default rules, as long as application of any rule
gives a theory consistent with X . Then if (W;E)=E we say that E is an extension
of W . We generalize this idea by letting W;X and so on range over an arbitrary Scott
domain. In Reiter’s case, the domain is the collection of deductively closed theories,
ordered by set-theoretic inclusion.
The basic idea of our paper, explained in a concrete setting, is this. A (syntactic)
system of normal defaults is just a 8nite collection  of pairs of form ❀ , where
;  are ordinary propositional formulas using “and”, “or”, and “not” connectives. We
read these in the usual way: “normally, if  then .” We also have an “initial” formula
 representing given background information, and a formula  which may or may
not be skeptically entailed by  and . The initial formula (in fact every ordinary
formula) is interpreted using Kleene’s three-valued truth tables. This results in the
“initial disjunctive state” being the set of all partial truth assignments satisfying ,
which is a so-called compact open set in the Scott topology over the domain D of
partial truth assignments—i.e., a Smyth powerdomain element.
Instead of using syntactic defaults as proof rules, we show how to induce semantic
defaults from the syntactic presentation of default constraints in . These defaults act
on the space of model sets, but this space is just the Smyth powerdomain, which is
again a Scott domain. Extensions of a normal default set can be de8ned over any Scott
domain, so this works perfectly well for the Smyth powerdomain. Extensions provide
a 8xpoint construction for the state transformers, from which skeptical entailment can
be de8ned easily.
This model-theoretic semantics for default rules inherits two key ideas of logical
systems built on domain theory. One is the concept of model-based partiality of in-
formation. Our general perspective is this. We believe that human reasoning is in
large part model-driven, in that inferences are made about mental “pictures” or “mod-
els”. These models are in turn reRections of situations [4], portions of the real world
in which objects stand in certain relations to each other, but in which not all is-
sues need be settled. The idea of model-based non-monotonicity is that from evi-
dence garnered from one of these partial situations or partial mental models, one ap-
plies pre-stored “constraints” or “rules”, in order to 8ll in information which may be
missing. This can be done in a non-deterministic manner, so that the 8lling-in pro-
cess can be completed in more than one way, resulting in new pictures (generally
inconsistent with each other), about which one can then reason, plan, or act. Non-
monotonicity arises when one is forced to alter these 8lled-in pictures in light of new
actual evidence.
The other idea is type metamorphosis, which refers to the way of treating a higher-
order object just as another ordinary object. “Programs as data” is a typical example
of type-metamorphosis underlying the whole area of domain theory. In our approach
this works in the reverse direction: a default rule of the base type is lifted to a set of
rule of a higher-type, i.e., the Smyth powerdomain, thus the name power defaults. This
approach allows us to obtain robust structural properties on extensions and by capital-
324 G.-Q. Zhang, W.C. Rounds / Theoretical Computer Science 323 (2004) 321–350
izing on these, to derive new and surprisingly low complexity results. We summarize
the results in the next subsection.
1.2. Overview of results
The results of this paper are of three kinds: properties of power default extensions,
algorithms and complexity for propositional default reasoning, and structural properties
of the induced non-monotonic consequence relation.
Results of the 8rst kind include the dichotomy theorem and the extension splitting
theorem. The dichotomy theorem states that when a set of default constraints on a
Scott domain D is lifted as a set of power defaults  on the Smyth powerdomain of
D, P(D), an element (i.e. compact, saturated set) either has a safe, unique -extension,
or else the multiple -extensions are all singleton-generated. The extension splitting
theorem states that any extension of the union of two compact open sets can be split
into the union of two corresponding extensions.
For the algorithmic properties of PDR, we consider problem instances (; ;  ),
where  and  are propositional formulas, and  is a set of default constraints; the
question is whether or not every model-theoretic extension of the set of models of 
is contained in the set of models of  . We prove that skeptical default inference, with
normal defaults, is a problem complete for co-NP(3), the third level of the Boolean
hierarchy [6]. (A related problem is shown to be complete for NP(4).) This means that
the class of valid instances of our problem can be written as a set (L1 ∩L2)∪L3, where
L1 and L3 are in co-NP, and L2 is in NP. Operationally speaking, this means that to
solve an instance of skeptical entailment, we will have to chain together at most two
calls to an NP oracle; and in fact SAT is an obvious candidate for such an oracle. The
best previous result using variants of the standard semantics for defaults is by Gottlob
[10], who shows that for the stationary semantics of default logic, due to Przymusinska
and Przymusinski [21] one obtains a PNP[log n] complete inference problem.
Here is a brief account of how the structural properties of extensions relate to algo-
rithmic complexity.
• We isolate an important subclass of problem instances for which there is a simple
co-NP test for deciding skeptical non-monotonic entailment. These are the so-called
safe instances. Roughly, a safe instance is a model (partial truth assignment) for 
which satis8es all the defaults ❀  as if they were standard material implications.
The entailment algorithm only works correctly if we know ahead of time that we
have safe problem instances. It is NP-complete to tell if we do have such an instance,
but there do exist polynomial criteria which we can impose on instances to guarantee
safety.
• All other instances of the problem are the so-called non-safe instances. If we know
ahead of time that we are looking at non-safe instances, then again we have a co-NP
algorithm for deciding non-monotonic entailment. In fact, non-monotonic inference
is identical to monotonic entailment in the non-safe setting.
• To justify our algorithms, we use the Dichotomy Theorem mentioned above. This
result shows us the structure of our model-theoretic extensions in both the safe and
the unsafe setting. Since either there is a safe instance, in which case there is a unique
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default extension of a set M of assignments, or else no instances are safe and the
multiple extensions are each singleton sets {g} of maximal (total) truth assignments
g∈M , we can use the safe-instance testing algorithm to classify problem instances
into just these two cases. Thus we need only three NP-oracles: one to classify the
instances as safe or unsafe, and the other two to 8nish the reasoning as above. In
fact, only two oracles need to be chained together in the strict case where the always
true propositional is not part of the instance, and three oracle chaining is needed for
the general case involving true.
Standard propositional default reasoning runs into problems with repeated consistency
checks, having to use an NP oracle at each step. Our algorithm avoids these checks,
except for the safety test at the beginning. This was an unexpected property of our
semantics. In the case of conjunctive systems, where  and  are in disjunctive normal
form (DNF), and the conclusions  of the default rules contain no disjunctions, the
skeptical inference problem is polynomial [26]. This contrasts sharply with results of
Kautz and Selman [12], who show NP-hardness results for similar (normal) instances
in standard default logic.
As for structural properties, we prove the following set of laws for the skeptical non-
monotonic consequence relation, including default reasoning by cases, and the Cautious
Monotony [14]. Both of these laws fail in standard default logic.
• Supraclassicality: p6q⇒p❀ q.
• Left Logical Equivalence: (p= q) & (p❀ r)⇒ q❀ r.
• Right Weakening: (p❀ q) & (q6r)⇒p❀ r.
• Cautious Cut: (p❀ q) & (p∧ q❀ r)⇒p❀ r.
• Cautious Monotony: (p❀ q) & (p❀ r)⇒p∧ q❀ r.
• Right And: (p❀ q) & (p❀ r)⇒ (p❀ q∧ r).
• Left Or: (p∨ q)❀ r⇔ (p❀ r)∧ (q❀ r).
• Right Or: p❀ (q∨ r)⇒ (p❀ q)∨ (p❀ r).
1.3. Previous work
Buneman and his students [5] pioneered the use of domain theory in database ap-
plications. Libkin’s thesis [15] contains a very good overview. The Buneman school
considers many more powerdomain constructions besides the Smyth powerdomain.
In arti8cial intelligence and natural language Pollard and Moshier [20] considered
a number of ways to use powerdomains to model grammatical inference, though the
8rst use of partial-order techniques in a setting related to arti8cial intelligence, was
by Pereira and Shieber [18] in providing a semantics for disjunctive feature structures
in computational linguistics. Our semantics was anticipated as well by Ait-Kaci [2],
but (for his -terms) he did not use domain theory explicitly. Another implicit use of
our semantics is in a paper by Gelfond et al. [8], who introduce a notion of disjunc-
tive defaults in order to overcome certain problematic examples involving disjunctive
reasoning in default logic.
This paper is an extended and integrated account of results reported in two pre-
vious conference papers by the authors. One is [26], Complexity of power default
reasoning (extended abstract), Proceedings of the 12th Annual IEEE Symposium on
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Logic in Computer Science (LICS’97). The other is [27], Power Defaults (preliminary
report), which appeared in Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Logic
programming and Non-monotonic Reasoning (LPNMR’97).
1.4. Plan of the paper
Section 2 provides background de8nitions in complexity theory, domain theory, three-
valued logic, Smyth powerdomain, and default domain theory. Section 3 introduces
power defaults. Section 4 presents the Dichotomy Theorem and the Extension Splitting
Theorem, fundamental properties related to extensions of power defaults. Section 5
contains the study of the complexity of propositional power default reasoning. Section
6 studies the non-monotonic consequence relation derived from power defaults. The
last section concludes by putting our results in perspective, and by brieRy mentioning
some experimental results.
2. Background denitions
We recall Kleene’s three-valued propositional logic 8rst so that we can use it as
running example to illustrate a variety of concepts. We will get back to this logic
again for complexity of propositional power default reasoning in Section 5.
2.1. Three-valued logic
The language of propositional, three-valued, logic with respect to a given (countable)
set of propositional variables Var can be concisely de8ned by using the BNF notation
p ::= x(∈ Var) | true | false | (p ∧ q) | (p ∨ q) | ¬p:
Strings in this language will be called propositional formulas or just formulas. This
syntax is the same as that of standard propositional logic. The di5erence lies in the se-
mantics. The meaning of a propositional formula is speci8ed by its behavior on partial
truth assignments (ptas). A pta is a function e : Var→{0; 1;⊥}, with 1 understood as
“true”, 0 as “false”, and ⊥ as “unde8ned”. Note that we use truth values 0 and 1 in
truth assignments, instead of false and true. This distinction is important. While true
and false belong to the syntax, 0 and 1 belong to the semantics, and they are not to
be confused conceptually.
It is customary to describe a pta by a string of variables and its complements. For
example, abcd represents the pta which assigns a and b to 1, and c and d to 0.
The set of all ptas forms a complete partial order (cpo—see 2.2) [Var→{0; 1;⊥}]
by de8ning the order pointwise: e e′ if e(x) e′(x) for every x∈Var, where the truth
values are ordered by letting ⊥ 0 and ⊥ 1 (0 and 1 will thus be incomparable).
We write T for this cpo.
There are several ways to look at the three-valued semantics. One is that it 8xes
a three-valued mapping for each formula. The second view is that it determines a
mapping such that, given any formula, given any pta, a truth value is determined.
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The third view is that it is completely determined by the meaning of the logical
connectives ∨;∧;¬. However, once the meanings of these connectives are 8xed, the
previous two interpretations are also 8xed.
The truth tables for ∨;∧ and ¬, usually attributed to Kleene, are given as follows.
∧ 1 0 ⊥
1 1 0 ⊥
0 0 0 0
⊥ ⊥ 0 ⊥
∨ 1 0 ⊥
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 ⊥
⊥ 1 ⊥ ⊥
¬
1 0
0 1
⊥ ⊥
These truth tables provide a method to evaluate any formula under a partial truth
assignment. Given any pta e : Var→ T, we have, inductively,
(1) true evaluates to 1 and false evaluates to 0, under any pta.
(2) for a variable x∈Var, it evaluates to e(x).
(3) p∧ q evaluates to 1 if both p and q evaluate to 1. It evaluates to ⊥ if one of the
p, q evaluate to 1 and the other one is unde8ned. If one of p, q evaluates to 0,
p ∧ q evaluates to 0. The other component need not even be evaluated.
(4) p∨ q evaluates to 1 if either p or q evaluate to 1. It evaluates to 0 if both p and
q evaluate to 0. Otherwise it is unde8ned.
(5) ¬p evaluates to 1 if p evaluates to 0, and to 0 if p to 1. Otherwise it is unde8ned.
Denition 1. If a formula  evaluates to 1 under a pta e according to the procedure
outlined above, we write e |= and say that e supports , or  evaluates to true under
e, or e is a satis8er of . We write Mod() for {e | e |=}, the set of satis8ers of .
Di5erent interpretations for the logical connectives are possible. The ones given
above correspond to the so called parallel (lazy) evaluation. Eager evaluation would
have resulted in more ⊥ entries in the truth tables, while sequential evaluation would
have resulted in asymmetric truth tables.
Notice that the truth tables above de8ne nothing else but three functions ∧ : (T× T)
→ T, ∨ : (T× T)→ T, and ¬ : T→ T. But they should really be considered as function-
als that provide three di5erent ways to build new functions of type [Var→ T]i (i=1
or 2) to T from given ones.
2.2. Domain theory
Domain theory, introduced by Scott in the late 1960s, provides a mathematical foun-
dation for the design, de8nition, and implementation of programming languages, and
for the speci8cation and veri8cation of programs. Its fundamental ideas are those of
partial information and successive approximation. The notion of partial information is
captured by a complete partial order (cpo). Functions acting on cpos are those which
preserve the limits of directed sets—this is the so-called continuity property. If one
thinks of directed sets as an approximating schema for in8nite objects, then members
of the directed set can be thought of as 8nite approximations. Continuity makes sure
that in8nite objects can be approximated by 8nite computations.
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An important property of continuous functions is that when ordered in appropriate
ways, they form a complete partial order again. Thus a continuous function becomes
once again an object in a partial order. The beauty of domain theory is that a higher-
order object is treated just as another ordinary object.
We recall some basic de8nitions in domain theory below; for further information on
domain theory, see, for example, [1,3,11,19,24,25].
Let (D;) be a partial order. A subset X of D is directed if it is non-empty and for
each pair of elements a; b∈X , there is an upper bound x∈X for {a; b}. A complete
partial order (cpo) is a partial order (D;) with a least element (⊥) and every directed
subset X has a least upper bound (or join)
⊔
X . Compact elements of a cpo (D;)
are those inaccessible by directed sets: a∈D is compact if for any directed set X of
D, a ⊔X implies that there exits x∈X with a x. We write %(D) for the set of
compact elements of D. A cpo is algebraic if every element is the join of a directed
set of compact elements. A set X ⊆D is bounded if it has an upper bound. If a pair
of elements {a; b} is bounded, we write a ↑ b. A cpo is bounded complete if every
bounded set has a join. Bounded complete algebraic cpos are called Scott domains.
Let (D;) be a cpo. A subset O of D is said to be Scott open if
• O is upward-closed, i.e., ∀x∈O ∀y∈D, xy implies y∈O, and
• whenever X ⊆D is directed and ⊔X ∈O we have X ∩O = ∅.
The Scott topology on a cpo (D;) consists of all the Scott open subsets of (D;).
One can verify that the collection of Scott open sets is indeed closed under 8nite
intersections and arbitrary unions. A fundamental interplay exists between the notion
of continuous functions and the notion of a topology: a function f from a cpo D to
a cpo E is continuous if and only if the inverse image f−1(O) of any Scott open set
O (of E) remains Scott open (in D).
Example 2. Let D be the set of all partial truth assignments from a countable set V of
variables to {0; 1}. Technically this set can be expressed as the set of all functions from
V to {0; 1;⊥}, where ⊥ 0 and also ⊥ 1. Such functions can be ordered pointwise
in the obvious way to form a complete partial order D. The compact elements of D
are the truth assignments which are non-⊥ on a 8nite set of variables. A set X of
such truth assignments is bounded if and only if none of the variables are assigned to
conRicting values by di5erent truth assignments, such as sending a variable x to 0 by
one assignment in X while sending x to 1 by another assignment in X . D is moreover
a Scott domain since any bounded set of truth assignments has a least upper bound,
which is the truth assignment sending a variable to 0 if any of the truth assignment in
the bounded set assigns the variable to 0, to 1 if any of the truth assignment in the
bounded set assigns the variable to 1, and to ⊥ otherwise.
If  is a propositional formula, then the set of satis8ers of , using Kleene’s truth
tables, is an open set in the Scott topology over D.
2.3. The Smyth powerdomain
Perhaps the most economical way to de8ne the Smyth powerdomain is via compact,
saturated subsets (see, for example, [1,25]). A subset X of a cpo D is called compact
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if every (in8nite) covering of X by Scott open sets contains a 8nite subcovering. X is
called saturated if it is the intersection of all Scott open sets containing X . The Smyth
powerdomain P(D) of a Scott domain D is the domain consisting of non-empty, Scott-
compact saturated subsets, ordered by reverse set inclusion. Note that the compact ele-
ments of the Smyth powerdomain P(D) are sets of the form ↑X := {y | ∃x∈X y x},
with X a non-empty, 8nite subset of %(D). These sets are also called the compact
opens. It is a fact that the Smyth powerdomain of any Scott domain is again a Scott
domain.
Since we are mostly working with 8nite cpos in this paper, it is useful to keep in
mind that for a 8nite Scott domain D, the Smyth powerdomain P(D) simply consists
of non-empty, upward-closed sets ordered by reverse inclusion. (A subset X is upward-
closed if X = ↑X .)
Denition 3. Let (X;) be a Scott domain. An antichain is a 8nite non-empty set of
pairwise incomparable compact elements of X .
We take antichains as representatives of (8nite) disjunctive structures. These have
the usual preorder:
Denition 4 (Smyth preorder). Let A and B be antichains on a domain (X;). We say
A] B i5 for all e∈B, there is some d∈A with d e.
The collection of 8nite antichains over a domain D represents the set of compact
elements of the Smyth powerdomain P(D) of D in the sense that every compact element
of the powerdomain is the upward closure of a 8nite antichain, and conversely the
Smyth powerdomain is standardly de8ned by “ideal completion” of the 8nite antichains
under the Smyth preorder, but we use the de8nition given above. For a proof of the
equivalence between the “ideal completion” de8nition and our de8nition, see [1].
Example 5. Let D be the set of all partial truth assignments considered earlier. If 
is a propositional formula, then the set of satis8ers of  is a compact open set. The
compact elements of the Smyth powerdomain P(D) correspond to the set of satis8ers
of propositional formulas.
2.4. Default domain theory
First, recall that if (D;) is a Scott domain, we de8ne a new domain D by
adjoining a new element  to D, and put D for x∈D.
Denition 6. Let (D;) be a Scott domain. A default set is a subset + of %(D)× %(D).
We call a pair (a; b)∈+ a (normal) default and think of it as a rule a : b
b
.
Example 7. Consider the domain of deductively closed sets of sentences. Then a de-
fault consists of a pair (’;  ), where ’ and  are sentences, and  is the deductive
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closure of the singleton set {}. This corresponds exactly to the normal default rule
’ :  
 
in the sense of Reiter.
We now present the general domain-theoretic version of Reiter’s operator  (which
he called ), used to build extensions of closed theories. In his case, x would be a
theory W , e would be a theory E, and (W;E) would be the smallest theory containing
W and closed under E-consistent application of user-speci8ed (normal) default rules
in a set +.
Denition 8. With respect to a default set + over a Scott domain D, de8ne (x; e) to
be the least element y of D such that
(1) xy; and
(2) for any default (a; b)∈+, if ay and b ↑ e (in D), then by.
We paraphrase (2) by saying that y is invariant under e-consistent default application.
Reiter provides a way to construct the function  iteratively. This can be imitated
in general Scott domains as well.
Lemma 9. Let (D;) be a Scott domain. Let + be a default set in D. We have
(x; e)=
⊔
i¿0 (x; e; i), where (x; e; 0)= x; and
(x; e; i + 1) = (x; e; i) unionsq⊔{b | (a; b) ∈ + & a  (x; e; i) & b ↑ e}
for all i¿0.
Before passing to the de8nition of extension, we mention two properties of the 
operator which appear in the folklore of default theories, but hold in general.
Lemma 10. The function (x; e) is monotonic in x for %xed e.
Lemma 11. The function (x; e) is antimonotonic in e for %xed x.
These lemmas can be easily proved using the iterative de8nition of . We return to
our main business.
Denition 12. We call e∈D an extension of x∈D if (x; e)= e.
Clearly extensions over the domain of 8rst-order theories are exactly Reiter’s exten-
sions.
The next theorem states some properties of extensions in general Scott domains. In
each case the proof is obtained by imitating the proof for 8rst-order theories.
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Theorem 13. Given a Scott domain D and a (normal) default set +, we have:
(1) Extensions always exist.
(2) If e is an extension of x then e x.
(3) If e is an extension of x and f is an extension of e then f= e.
(4) If e and f are distinct extensions of x then e and f have no upper bound in D.
(5) If e is an extension of x and y e, then e is an extension of xunionsqy.
Note that in the last property, we used bounded completeness of D to ensure the
existence of xunionsqy.
Finally, we state a general notion of (skeptical) non-monotonic consequence over an
arbitrary Scott domain, equipped with a default set +.
Denition 14. Let d be a 8nite element and x an arbitrary element of a Scott domain
(D;). We say that x is a non-monotonic consequence of d, and write d |∼ x, if x e
for every +-extension e of d.
Technically, we should subscript |∼ with the default set +, but the default set will
always be clear from context.
2.5. The Boolean hierarchy
Assuming the basic knowledge about the P and NP language classes for complexity,
the Boolean hierarchy (BH) [6,7] is de8ned as follows:
NP(0) = P;
NP(2i + 1) = {LA ∪ LB |LA ∈ NP(2i); LB ∈ NP};
NP(2i + 2) = {LA ∩ LB |LA ∈ NP(2i + 1); LB ∈ co-NP};
BH =
⋃
i¿0
NP(i):
Naturally, there are the complementary classes co-NP(i)= {L |L∈NP(i)}. Of particular
interest to us is co-NP(3) and NP(4). We have
co-NP(3) = {(L1 ∩ L2) ∪ L3 |L1; L3 ∈ co-NP; L2 ∈ NP}
and
NP(4) = {L1 ∩ [L2 ∪ (L3 ∩ L4)] |L1; L4 ∈ co-NP; L2; L3 ∈ NP}:
In [6] it is shown that BH is exactly the Boolean closure of NP. One can think of the
class as de8ned by Boolean expressions, where the basic expressions are NP predicates.
Since the satis8ability problem sat for propositional logic is NP-complete and the
tautology problem taut is co-NP-complete, we can use sat and taut as predicates over
propositional formulas and use Boolean combinations of these predicates to construct
problems complete in the Boolean hierarchy.
For example, deciding the truth of the formula
(taut(p) ∧ sat(q)) ∨ taut(r);
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where p; q; r are propositional formulas, is co-NP(3)-complete. Similarly,
taut(p) ∧ (sat(q) ∨ (sat(r) ∧ taut(s)))
is an NP(4)-complete problem.
3. Power defaults
3.1. Examples
As we have said, our version of default logic is similar in spirit to that of Reiter’s
logic, but we use defaults in a very di5erent setting [22]. To motivate our de8nition,
we use an example based on Gunter and Scott’s introduction [11] to powerdomain
theory.
Disjunctive descriptions of a fruit bag. Suppose I hold a bag of fruit, and I wish
to give you information about what is in the bag. One such description might be
“A fruit in the bag is a yellow fruit or a red fruit.” This disjunctive description is based
on two conjunctive items “yellow fruit” and “red fruit”. A way to think of “yellow
fruit” is as the partial function mapping the variables y to 1 and f to 1, and all other
variables to an “unde8ned” element ⊥. We will just write yf for such an assignment.
These assignments are partially ordered pointwise as maps from the set of variables
into {0; 1}⊥, and form a Scott domain thereby. To model the disjunctive combination,
we can therefore use the antichain {yf ; rf }. Now the foregoing description is less
informative than “A fruit in the bag is a yellow fruit or a cherry or a strawberry”, and
correspondingly we have
{rf; yf} ] {rfc; rfs; yf};
where we have further quali8ed red fruit with cherry and strawberry features.
We next consider three-valued formulas. If  is a propositional formula, and g is
a partial truth assignment such that g |=, then in Kleene’s system, for any f g,
we have f |=. So, the set of satisfying partial truth assignments for a formula is the
upward closure of the set of minimal satis8ers. In general, any such upward-closed set
is the set Mod() of satis8ers of some formula . Consider the set MinMod() of
minimal satis8ers of a formula. It is easy to check that MinMod()] MinMod( )
i5 Mod()⊇Mod( ). Thus, the Smyth powerdomain P(D) is the set of (non-empty)
upward-closed subsets of our domain D of partial truth assignments, ordered by reverse
subset inclusion.
3.2. Semantic constraints and updates
In standard default logic, we represent constraints as pseudo-proof rules of form
 : 

. (We consider only normal defaults in this paper.) The meaning is that if we have
the formula  in our theory, and  is consistent with our desired “8nal” theory, then
we can add . Standard default logic in fact works with a Scott domain: the domain of
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propositional theories, ordered by set-theoretic inclusion. Our default semantics works
in exactly the same way, only using the Smyth powerdomain. So normal defaults
will be objects of form
K : L
L
, where K and L are upward-closed sets of partial truth
assignments. We will insist, however, that these defaults (which might as well be
written as pairs (K; L)) be derived from our syntactic default constraints.
We now show how to obtain defaults in the Smyth powerdomain from syntactic
constraints. Let us begin with an example. Suppose that we wish to say
(1) By default; a piece of fruit in the bag is a red fruit or a yellow fruit:
This should be a defeasible statement if there is a grape in the bag. Further, if we
have solid information that there is nothing red in the bag, we still should be able to
infer by default that there is a piece of yellow fruit.
In our approach, default assertions such as (1) will be modeled by syntactic con-
straints of the form ❀ , where  and  are propositional formulas. Thus, (1) would
read
(2) f ❀ (r ∧ f) ∨ (y ∧ f):
Positive assertions of evidence are Rat statements like f∧¬r ∧¬y, coding the grape
example, or just ¬ r, coding the “no red things” assertion. (In general, these assertions
are allowed to be disjunctive.) We might also want to state that there are no red fruits
in the bag, just by default. This would provide another default constraint f❀¬r.
The diTculty to keep in mind is that these defaults should permit reasoning by cases.
We have a two-stage process. The intermediate stage is a construct called a semantic
constraint. In example (2), we would create a pair
(f; ↑ {rf; yf});
where now f is a truth assignment de8ned to be 1 only on the variable f, and ↑{rf ; yf }
stands for the upward closure of the (similarly notated) truth assignments rf and yf.
In such a constraint, the set on the right is a Smyth powerdomain element, and the
element on the left is just a truth assignment. If we were working with a more general
constraint ❀ , we would create several semantic constraints of form (d; ) where d
is a minimal satis8er of , and  is used ambiguously to denote the upward closure of
the set of minimal models of the syntactic formula .
The 8nal stage in the creation of normal power defaults is to lift semantic constraints
so that the 8rst element of a pair is a Smyth powerdomain element. We do this as
follows. If (d; ) is a semantic constraint, then we add a large number of defaults to
our system. Take any K such that d subsumes a generator b of K (a generator of K is
a minimal element of K). Consider the upward closure of all of the generators except
b, and add in the set (↑{b})∩ . This is called updating K by replacing b by b∩ ,
and is notated K[b← b∩ ]. Then our defaults are all pairs (K; K[b← b∩ ]), provided
that the second element of the pair is not actually empty.
This “update semantics” says that if we have a disjunctive description K at some
stage, and some generator b of K entails a de8nite description d, then we can have
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all the disjunctive possibilities we had before, except that the description b can be
improved by conjoining it with the description , where (d; ) is a semantic constraint
derived from our syntactic presentation. Notice that the updated K is a more informative
description than K was.
In our example, suppose that we have the description K = ↑{rf ; yf }. Consider the
syntactic default f❀¬ r. This gives rise to a semantic constraint (f; ↑{¬r}). Since
f rf , we can update rf in K . Thus K[rf ← rf ∩¬r] = ↑{yf }. We could also update
yf, deriving ↑{rf ; yf¬r}. Perhaps this would rule out orange fruit.
3.3. Power defaults on domains
With these examples in mind, we move to the oTcial de8nition of power defaults.
Denition 15. A default constraint over the Smyth powerdomain P(D) of a Scott do-
main (D;) is a pair (d; ), where d∈D and  is a non-empty compact open subset
of X .
For the next de8nition, if A is a compact open set, we let 0(A) be the 8nite set of
generators of A. Thus A= ↑0(A).
Denition 16. Let A be a compact open subset of D. If  is a compact open set, and
a∈ 0(A), we say that
A[a← a ∩ ] =↑ (0(A) \ {a}) ∪ (↑ a ∩ )
is an update of A, provided it is not empty.
This de8nition is due to Libkin [15]. It says that an elementary way to improve
information in a compact open set is to improve one of its generators. Notice that
“improving” a generator is represented by intersection here, corresponding to the Smyth
ordering.
Example 17. A general picture of updating is presented in Fig. 1.
In this picture, the set A is the upward closure of the three element set {a1; a2; a3}.
The set  is indicated by lighter lines in the top half of the 8gure. It is generated by
the set {t1; t2}. To update a1, we remove this element from the set of generators of A,
and take the upward closure of {a1; a2}. This leaves the other two dark “cones” intact.
Then we add back in the set (↑a1)∩ . This results in the two new generators t and u
shown above a1 in the 8gure.
The next de8nition provides the actual lifting of default constraints to the power-
domain setting. Recall that a normal default set in any domain has to be a relation
whose 8eld is the set of 8nite elements of that domain.
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Fig. 1. Updating a1∈A by the set .
Denition 18. Let  be a set of default constraints over P(D). The default set +
determined by  is the set of pairs
{(A; A[a← a ∩ ]) |A ∈ %(P(D)); (d; ) ∈ ; and d  a}:
When clear from context, we omit the subscript .
In general, for arbitrary Scott domains, we simply provide  as a set of semantic
constraints. But when we have a syntax, we can derive the semantic constraints from
syntactic ones as in the case of 3-valued logic. This is done by considering each pair
❀  of formulas, and adding all semantic constraints of the form (d; ) where d is
a minimal satis8er of , and  is (by abuse of notation) the set of satis8ers of the
syntactic formula .
4. Characterizing extensions
Now, we can turn the crank of Reiter’s extension mechanism. Using our Smyth
power defaults, we de8ne extensions in exactly the same way that they were de8ned
for default logic. We start with a powerdomain element. Then we “iterate” the defaults
induced from . What happens, in e5ect, is that instead of getting larger and larger
theories, as in standard default logic, our ordering is reversed, and we get smaller and
smaller sets of partial models. Thus the whole enterprise is really directed the same
way as in standard default logic; the di5erence is that we have used partiality in the
underlying domain, and have preserved it in the Smyth powerdomain. In this section,
we establish basic properties associated with extensions derived from power defaults
in the Smyth powerdomain.
Our 8rst objective is the Dichotomy Theorem. It requires the following basic
de8nition.
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Denition 19. Let D be a Scott domain,  be a set of semantic default constraints,
and M a non-empty compact open subset of D. An element e∈D is said to be safe if
(1) e∈M , and
(2) for any semantic constraint (d; )∈, if d e then ↑e∩ = ↑e.
Further, an extension E of M is said to be safe if there is a safe element e∈E.
The idea of the de8nition is that a safe element e is one to which none of the
applicable defaults can add any new information. Of course, the idea of safety is with
respect to starting information; this is why we have the initial information M .
Remark 20. In the example of three-valued propositional logic, it is easy to see that
if M is the set of minimal satis8ers of a formula , and  is a set of syntactic default
constraints of form (; ), then an partial truth assignment e is safe if and only if (i)
e |=, and (ii) for each ❀ ∈, if e |= , then e |= .
Our 8rst main result characterizes extensions using the concept of safe elements.
Theorem 21 (Dichotomy Theorem). Let  be a set of semantic constraints, and let
+ be the associated set of Smyth power defaults. If the compact saturated set
M contains a safe element, then there will be a unique safe +-extension E of M .
If M does not contain a safe element, then the (multiple) extensions of M will all be
of form ↑g, for certain g∈M .
The proof of the Dichotomy Theorem rests on several lemmas. The 8rst of
these is just a restatement for the Smyth powerdomain of the extension operator
(De8nition 8).
Lemma 22. Let M and W be compact saturated sets. Set (M;W ) is the inclusion-
largest compact saturated set Y such that
(1) M ⊇Y ; and
(2) whenever (K; K[a← a∩ ]) is a default with K ⊇Y and K[a← a∩ ]∩W = ∅,
then Y =K[a← a∩ ]∩Y .
Now, we turn to a lemma giving us information about general compact saturated
sets. Recall that 0A is the set of minimal elements of A.
Lemma 23. Suppose A is a compact, saturated subset of a Scott domain D. Then A
is minimal generated: ↑0A=A.
Proof. Since A is saturated, A is the intersection of all Scott opens O such that O⊇A.
However, each Scott open set can be expressed as an (in8nite) union of compact open
sets. Since A is compact, we know that A is in fact the intersection of all compact
Scott opens O such that O⊇A.
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For any element x∈A, we want to show that there exists a minimal element y∈A
such that xy.
Fix an arbitrary element x∈A, consider a chain C of ↓x∩A. The greatest lower
bound of C, C, exists in D, since the set of all lower bounds of C is non-empty;
and it is directed because of the following argument. Two lower bounds of C certainly
subsume some element of C, so their least upper bound subsumes the same element of
C. This least upper bound subsumes any other element of C, because any element of
C is an upper bound for both lower bounds of C. Thus the set of lower bounds of C
is in fact directed, and has a least upper bound C. We show that C is a member
of ↓x∩A, as well.
Let O be any compact open set containing A. Clearly, C ⊆O. Since O is compact,
0O is a 8nite set, and O= ↑0O. This implies that there exists some a∈ 0O such that
C ⊆↑a, and hence C ∈↑a, which implies C ∈O. Therefore, C is a member of
every compact open set containing A.
To summarize, we have shown that for any element x∈A, the non-empty set ↓x∩A
has the property that every chain in it has a lower bound. By Zorn’s lemma, ↓x∩A
has a minimal element, say, y. Such a y is a minimal element of A subsuming x.
The next lemma gives an “approximation property” for compact saturated sets in
any Scott domain. It will be needed to deal with general extensions, because these are
“limits” of compact opens, not compact opens themselves. We call it the Interpolation
Theorem. This is applied to yield the Dichotomy Theorem.
Lemma 24 (Interpolation Theorem). Let E be a compact saturated set over a coherent
algebraic dcpo, g be a minimal element of E, and d be a compact element subsuming
g. For any compact open set K such that K ⊇E, there exists a compact open set L,
such that
(1) K ⊇L⊇E,
(2) the minimal element l of L subsuming g is unique, and
(3) d l.
Proof. Choose a minimal element f of K subsuming g. Let l be the least upper bound
of d and f, so that l g. Let R= {x∈K ∩K(D) | x  g}. Consider the collection C of
all ↑x for x∈R together with ↑l. We claim that this is an open cover of E. In proof, let
e∈E. Without loss of generality, g does not subsume e. Hence by algebraicity of Scott
domains, there is a compact element n∈D such that n e but n does not subsume g.
Since e∈E, then there is a b∈ 0K with b e. Then the least upper bound m of b and
n is in K ∩K(D), so that m subsumes e but not g. Thus C is an open cover of E. By
compactness, C has a 8nite subcover for E. The union of the sets of this subcover has
the desired properties.
This completes the lemmas which hold in general; now we consider extensions
explicitly. In the next lemma, we use the “iterative” characterization (Lemma 9) of the
function , restated for the Smyth powerdomain. We use the following abbreviation:
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for sets U and W , put
+(U;W )
:=
⋂{K[b← b ∩ ] | (K; K[b← b ∩ ]) ∈ + & K ⊇ U
& K[b← b ∩ ] ∩W = ∅}:
Now, we give the iterative de8nition of the function  as follows:
(M;W; 0) =M;
(M;W; n+ 1) = (M;W; n) ∩ +((M;W; n); W );
(M;W ) =
⋂
n¿0
(M;W; n):
Lemma 25. If there is a safe element e under a system of constraints, then for any
powerdomain element W , we have e∈ (M;W ).
Proof. We show e∈ (M;W; n) for all n. If n=0, then this is just (i) of De8ni-
tion 19. Assume e∈ (M;W; n). Let (K; K[a← a∩ ]) be a default with K ⊇ (M;W; n)
and W ∩K[a← a∩ ] = ∅. If a does not subsume e, then e remains in the updated
K , and so e must be in (M;W; n + 1). Otherwise a e, so that ↑a⊇↑e. But then
↑a∩ ⊇ ↑e∩ = ↑e. So e is still in the next approximation (M;W; n+ 1).
Lemma 26. If E is a safe extension of M with respect to , then
E = ↑{e∈M | e is a safe element}:
In other words, if there exists a safe element, then the extension is just the upward-
closure of all safe elements.
Proof. Given Lemmas 23 and 25, all we need to show is that every generator of a
safe extension is a safe element. Let g be a generator of the safe extension E. If g is
not safe, then there is a semantic constraint (d; ) such that d g but ↑g∩ ⊂↑g. We
specify a compact open set K including E, where d subsumes one of its generators y,
such that E ∩K[y←y∩ ] (i) is not empty, and (ii) is not equal to E. This violates
Lemma 22, as E= (M;E).
We de8ne K as follows. Apply the Interpolation Theorem using X =M and the
elements d and g in the previous paragraph. Let K be the obtained set Y , and y∈K
be the unique generator of K subsuming g. Since dy, and since the updated set
K[y←y∩ ] still contains a safe element e∈E, the default (K; K[y←y∩ ]) is ap-
plicable. But since g =∈ , we have our desired contradiction.
Proof (Dichotomy Theorem). Suppose M has a safe extension E. By Lemma 26, E is
the unique extension of M , being the upward closure of the set of safe elements in M .
To show that unsafe extensions are singleton generated, let g1 and g2 be distinct
non-safe generators of E. Since g1 is unsafe, there is a semantic constraint (d; ) such
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that d g1 but g1 =∈ . By the algebraic property of D, there is a compact element
d′ such that dd′ g1, but g2 =∈↑d′. Now apply the Interpolation Theorem and let
K be a compact open superset of E which has a unique generator g subsuming g2,
and, moreover, d′ g. The update of K at g with respect to (d; ) is consistent with
E, since g2 is a common member; however, the update is no longer a superset of E
because it does not contain g1.
We now turn to the next main result:
Theorem 27 (Extension Splitting Theorem). Let + be a set of normal defaults deter-
mined as in De%nition 18. Consider two non-empty compact saturated sets W1 and
W2. Then any extension E of W1 ∪W2, using + as the default set, can be written as
a union E=E1 ∪E2, where E1 and E2 are either empty or extensions of W1 and W2,
respectively.
Before beginning the proof, let us consider the example of three-valued logic to show
how this theorem sanctions reasoning by cases. Let  be a set of default constraints
❀ . Let , 8, and  be three-valued propositional formulas. Suppose that  |∼  .
This means that every extension of Mod() is contained in Mod( ), where Mod()
is just the set of all partial truth assignments satisfying . Similarly suppose 8 |∼  .
We want to show that ∨ 8 |∼  ; by de8nition, this means that every extension of
Mod(∨ 8) is a subset of Mod( ). Since
Mod( ∨ 8) = Mod() ∪Mod(8);
the result follows immediately from the Splitting Theorem.
Proof (Extension Splitting Theorem). Apply the Dichotomy Theorem. Suppose 8rst
that E is a safe extension of W1 ∪W2. All safe elements of W1 ∪W2 are in E, and
a safe element of E is either a safe element of W1 or a safe element of W2. So, if
W1 ∩ 0E is non-empty then it is the set of all minimal safe elements of W1. This means
that it must be the set of generators of the unique safe extension E1 of W1. Similar
remarks apply to W2, giving us the set E2.
Now suppose that there are no safe elements in W1 ∪W2. Then by Dichotomy, E= ↑g
for some g in W1 ∪W2. Without loss of generality, g∈W1. Then we have
(W1 ∪W2) ⊇ W1 ⊇ ↑g;
so that by Theorem 13, item(5), ↑g is an extension of W1. If g∈W2 as well, then
similar remarks show that ↑g is an extension of W2.
The above proof of the Splitting Theorem is non-constructive (note the use of Zorn’s
Lemma in Lemma 23). Our original proof was much more constructive, but gave no
hint of the general picture of Smyth power extensions. Here is a quick overview of
that proof, which does make use of new properties of the extension operator  in any
Scott domain.
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The 8rst lemma is speci8c to the Smyth powerdomain:
Lemma 28. Let E be an extension of W1 ∪W2. Then
(W1 ∪W2; E) = (W1; E) ∪ (W2; E):
This lemma can be proved by induction. But the proof is not easy, and depends on
establishing essentially the structural lemma needed for the induction step by assum-
ing that the sets W1 and W2 are compact open, that is, 8nite elements of the Smyth
powerdomain. We have to overcome the fact, though, that the lemma is false unless
E is an extension of W1 ∪W2. This is handled using a special combinatorial argument.
We then argue using continuity considerations that the needed structural lemma holds
for general compact saturated sets. In the midst of all of this we have to change the
set of defaults.
Once we have attained Lemma 28, we still need to show how it entails the Splitting
Theorem. This comes from a new and general fact about extensions in any Scott
domain. We therefore include the proof.
Theorem 29. Let + be a default set in a Scott domain, and suppose xy, and that
e is an extension of x. If (y; e) is not , then it is an extension of y.
Proof. Suppose xy. By Lemma 10, we have (x; e) (y; e). But (x; e)= e, so
e (y; e). By Lemma 11, (y; (y; e)) (y; e). The lemma will now follow if we
can show that (y; e) (y; (y; e)). We do this by induction, showing that for each i
(y; e; i)  (y; (y; e); i):
The basis is clear. Assume the result for i. By de8nition
(y; e; i + 1) = (y; e; i) unionsq⊔{b | (a; b)∈+ ∧ a  (y; e; i) ∧ b ↑ e}:
Now notice that any b’s used on the right actually subsume (y; e), because (y; e) is
the least upper bound of all the (y; e; i) as i goes to in8nity. Therefore the expression
on the right subsumes
(y; (y; e); i) unionsq⊔{b | (a; b)∈+ ∧ a  (y; (y; e); i) ∧ b ↑ (y; e)}
by inductive hypothesis and our observation on the b’s. But the last line is just
(y; (y; e); i + 1).
The Splitting Theorem follows if we take e=E, x=W1 ∪W2, and successively
y=W1, then y=W2 in Theorem 29 (recall that the ordering in the Smyth power-
domain is reverse inclusion.)
5. Algorithms and completeness
Let  be a set of default (syntactic) constraints, and ;  be formulas in a proposi-
tional logic L. The triple S =(; ;  ) is called a system. The set VS is the set of
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propositional variables appearing anywhere in S; D(VS), or simply D, is the set of
partial truth assignments over this 8nite set, and P(D) is its Smyth powerdomain.
The set of power defaults is given in the next de8nition which is a specialization of
De8nition 18.
Denition 30. The set  of semantic constraints consists of, for each syntactic con-
straint ❀  in , pairs of form (d; ) where d is a minimal satis8er of , and  is
(by abuse of notation) the set of satis8ers of the syntactic formula . The set of power
defaults + consists of pairs
{(K; K[a← a ∩ ]) |K ∈ %(P(D)); (d; )∈; and d  a}:
The main results of this section are
(1) The skeptical non-monotonic inference problem (SNIP) with respect to a sys-
tem S =(; ;  ) is co-NP(3)-complete for strict three valued-propositional logic.
“Strict” means that the formula true is not used. As a consequence, the truth value
of a formula is always ⊥ under the completely unde8ned partial truth assignment.
As is in [9], the size of a system S =(; ;  ) is the total number of symbols
occurring in S, which is a sum of the sizes of the formula ,  and all formulas
in . Note that the size of a system always dominate the total number of variables
occurring in the system.
(2) General SNIP is NP(4)-complete, where the formula true can be used.
The idea behind of our algorithms is based on the structure of extensions in the Kleene
logic setting. This section 8rst specializes, without proof, the Dichotomy Theorem to
the special case of propositional logic. We then turn to a in-depth analysis of non-safe
extensions.
Denition 31. With respect to a formula  and a set  of syntactic constraints, a
partial truth assignment e is safe if
(1) e |=, and
(2) for every syntactic constraint ❀  in , if e |= , then e |= .
Corollary 32. The problem of determining, for a formula  and set  of syntactic
constraints, whether there is a safe element with respect to these, is NP-complete.
Proof. To check whether there is a safe element, we guess a partial truth assignment
e. Then, by De8nition 31, we can check if e is safe in polynomial time. The hardness
proof is a simple reduction from CNF-SAT.
As a result of the Dichotomy Theorem and the above corollary, we have the next
result, which is simply a restatement in this speci8c propositional setting.
Corollary 33. For a system of constraints  and satis%able formula , we have
(1) if there is a safe element e under a system of constraints, then the set M
of satis%ers of (a satis%able)  has a unique extension, which is safe.
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(2) either there is a unique safe extension E of M =Mod(), or no extensions are
safe.
(3) it is an NP-complete problem to decide if a system has a (unique) safe extension.
5.1. Non-safe extensions
Now, we turn to the analysis of non-safe (we also say unsafe) extensions. This is a
little more subtle than the safe case, but also a little more surprising.
Our 8rst result is easy, but a bit unexpected. It uses Lemma 22.
Lemma 34. If E is a non-safe extension of M, then E= ↑g for a single element g
of D.
Proof. Suppose E has at least two generators g and h. Then since these generators are
not safe, one of them can be properly updated, and the result will still be E-consistent
(we do not update the other). This violates invariance of E under E-consistent rule
application.
Because of this result, we can turn attention to criteria for deciding if a system has
a “singleton” extension ↑g.
Refer again to the conditions in Lemma 22. We are interested in W = ↑g, and we
seek a characterization of the condition (M; ↑g)= ↑g. We 8x a terminology to make
the description easier.
Denition 35. With respect to a system of constraints  and satis8able formula , a
compact open set Y is called g-invariant for a partial truth assignment g if whenever
(K; K[a← a∩ ]) is a default with K ⊇Y and K[a← a∩ ]∩↑g = ∅, then Y =K[a← a
∩ ]∩Y .
Lemma 36. Assume that there are no safe elements. Let g∈M , and assume g =⊥.
Then the set ↑g is g-invariant if and only if g is a maximal element of the %nite
domain D of partial truth assignments ( for  and ).
Proof. Assume 8rst that there are two or more propositional variables in  and . Let
g∈M be an (unsafe) element which is not maximal. By assumption, g =⊥. Since g
is unsafe, there is a constraint (d; ) (derived from some syntactic constraint ❀  in
) with d g, but g =∈ . Since g is not maximal, and not ⊥, then at least one variable
x must be set to a 0 or 1 value in g, and another variable y to ⊥. De8ne a g′❂ g by
setting y to 0 (1 would also do); and then let a be obtained from g′ by setting x to
⊥. Then the set K = {a; g} has two incomparable generators, and contains g. The set
K[g← g∩ ] furthermore is consistent with ↑g, and properly updates ↑g. Thus ↑g is
not g-invariant.
Conversely, suppose that g is maximal in M . Then clearly {g}(= ↑g) is g-invariant
because if K[b← b∩ ]∩{g} = ∅ then g∈K[b← b∩ ].
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It remains to consider the case where there is only one propositional variable. But
then all elements which are not ⊥ are maximal already.
At this point, in analyzing the possibilities for unsafe extensions, we know that
(1) all unsafe extensions are of form ↑g for some partial truth assignment g.
(2) if g =⊥, then ↑g is a g-invariant if and only if g is maximal.
(3) if  = true, then any extension of M =Mod() must be a singleton maximal point
g |=.
We now analyze the condition that such a g-invariant set {g} is the largest g-invariant
Y with Y ⊆M .
Lemma 37. Assume there are no safe elements, and let g∈M be maximal and Y ⊆M
be g-invariant. Then Y is not a subset of {g} if and only if all generators y of Y
strictly subsume g (i.e. y❁ g).
Proof. Assume Y is as stated, with a generator y0 not subsuming g. We show that y0
must be safe—a contradiction.
Consider a constraint ❀  with y0 |= . Let K =Y ∪{g}. We claim that K is still
g-invariant. This is clear if g∈Y . If not, then we have {g}∩Y = ∅. So any updates
whose result is g-consistent have to apply either to generators of Y or to g itself. By
Lemma 36, since g is maximal, {g} is g-invariant. So these updates cannot a5ect g.
Now consider the generator y0 of K . The set K[y0←y0 ∩ ] is certainly consistent with
{g} since the update leaves g una5ected. But since by assumption K is g-invariant,
and g is also g-invariant (by Lemma 36), K =Y ∪{g} is g-invariant. We have y0 |= .
So y0 is safe. The converse is trivial.
The next lemma reduces the search for g-invariant sets even more.
Lemma 38. Under the conditions stated above, if Y is a g-invariant set, then it must
be singleton-generated.
Proof. If Y is a subset of {g}, then there is nothing to prove. So suppose Y ⊆ {g}. By
the previous lemma, all generators of Y must (strictly) subsume g. Suppose there are
more than one generators for Y . Fix one of the generators y0 of Y . Since y0 is unsafe,
there is some ❀ ∈ such that y0 |= , but y0 =∈ . Now applying (Y; Y [y0←y0 ∩ ])
to Y (note that g is still a member in Y [y0←y0 ∩ ]), and we get a proper update—a
contradiction.
Our next lemma is the real surprise.
Lemma 39. If there is no safe element, and {g} is a g-invariant set with g maximal
and g∈M , then there is no y0❁ g, y0 =⊥, and y0 ∈M such that ↑y0 is g-invariant.
Proof. Let y0 ∈M , and y0❁ g with y0 =⊥. Since y0 is not safe, there is a constraint
(d; ) with dy0, such that y0 =∈ (↑y0 ∩ ). Choose another element r ∈D with r g
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but r incomparable with y0. Since g is maximal and y0 =⊥, this is certainly possible.
Consider the default pair
({r; y0}; {r; y0}[y0 ← y0 ∩ ]):
The second element of this pair still contains g because r g. But the default properly
updates y0.
Theorem 40. Assume that there are no safe elements for the system (; ;  ). If
⊥ |= (i.e.,  is not equivalent to true), then the extensions of M =Mod() are
those singleton sets {g} such that g is maximal and g |=.
Proof. Since we assume that  is not equivalent to true, the result follows immediately
from Lemmas 36 and 39.
5.2. SNIP
The next de8nition is a specialization of skeptical non-monotonic consequence rela-
tion (De8nition 14) to power default reasoning in propositional logic.
Denition 41 (Non-monotonic Consequence). Given a system S =(; ;  ), we say
that  |∼  if
(1)  is unsatis8able, or
(2)  is satis8able, and Mod( )⊇E for any extension E of Mod().
We can now make precise our complexity problem.
The Skeptical Non-monotonic Inference Problem (SNIP).
Instance: A system S =(; ;  ), where the formula true is not used.
Property:  |∼  .
The main results of this section appear in the next several theorems.
Theorem 42. SNIP is in co-NP(3) for systems S =(; ;  ) with ⊥ =∈Mod().
Note that there is a low degree polynomial algorithm to check ⊥ =∈Mod(). Since
the formula true is not used in the system S =(; ;  ), we have ⊥ =∈Mod().
Proof. We present an NP(3) algorithm for the complementary problem. This algorithm
will accept those systems S =(; ;  ) such that it is not the case that  |∼  . This
happens if and only if
(1)  is satis8able and
(2) there is an extension E of M =Mod() not contained in Mod( ).
To do this it only has to verify that some generator of E does not satisfy  .
Given a system S =(; ;  ), our algorithm carries out the following steps.
(1) Use—as an oracle—the non-deterministic polynomial algorithm that, determines
for S, whether or not there is a safe element e with e∈M =Mod(). This is
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possible by Corollary 32. If the answer returned is “yes”, go to step 2, else to
step 3.
(2) Using Corollary 32 once again, guess an element e, verify that it is safe (this
entails satisfying ), and further does not satisfy  . If this branch of the algorithm
succeeds, then there is a safe extension with a generator not satisfying  , since the
element e must be above a generator of a safe extension. If the generator satis8ed
 , then e would too, by persistence. Conversely, if there is a safe extension, with
a generator not satisfying  , we know by Corollary 33 that every generator is
safe. Our algorithm guesses all possible safe elements in M =Mod(), so it must
succeed on such a generator. Note that it does not have to check that what it has
found is actually a generator!
(3) At this point, we know that there are no safe extensions. We now check for the
existence of a non-safe extension (necessarily of form {g}) such that g |=  . Given
the triple (; ;  ), we continue with the following steps.
(4) First, non-deterministically guess a maximal element g of D(VS).
(5) Check that g |= . If not, fail. Otherwise go to the next step.
(6) When this step is reached, we know that g is an extension of M . Check that
g |=  . If so, succeed, otherwise fail.
The hardness proof uses a standard complete language for co-NP(3):
co-SAT(3) = {(P;Q; R) | (sat(P) ∧ taut(Q)) ∨ taut(R)};
where the predicates sat and taut are as explained in Section 2.5.
Theorem 43 (co-NP(3)-Completeness). SNIP is co-NP(3)-complete.
Proof. We only have to establish that the problem is hard for co-NP(3). Given any
Boolean expression triple (P;Q; R), we construct an instance of skeptical non-monotonic
consequence as follows. First, rename the Boolean variables so that P, Q and R do
not share common variables.
Now introduce a single default constraint, ¬R❀P ∧ ∧i∈I (xi ∨¬ xi), where {xi | i∈ I}
is the set of all variables appearing in P;Q, or R, after the renaming of variables.
We can then show that
(sat(P) ∧ taut(Q)) ∨ taut(R)
if and only if ¬R |∼ P ∧Q.
Here are some special types of systems for which the safety test is simple; so our
overall complexity is reduced.
Denition 44. A system (; ;  ) is conjunctive i5 the formula  and all of the for-
mulas  appearing as default conclusions contain no occurrences of ∨.
Theorem 45. There is a polynomial-time algorithm to decide whether or not a con-
junctive system is safe.
346 G.-Q. Zhang, W.C. Rounds / Theoretical Computer Science 323 (2004) 321–350
The proof shows how to inductively construct a (singleton) safe extension if there
is one.
Corollary 46. The skeptical entailment problem for conjunctive systems is in co-NP.
Corollary 47. The previous corollary holds for systems which are conjunctive, except
that the starting formula is allowed to be a disjunction of conjunctions.
Corollary 48. For a conjunctive system, the question of whether the system is safe
and  |∼  can be answered in polynomial time.
Corollary 49. If in a conjunctive system (; ;  ), the formula  is in DNF and is
not equal to true, and  is in DNF, then the skeptical inference problem is in P.
5.3. NP(4)-completeness for general SNIP
This subsection focuses on systems S =(; ;  ) where Mod()= ↑⊥, i.e.,  is
equivalent to true. Since the Dichotomy Theorem works for the Smyth powerdomain
of any Scott domain, the system still has only two kinds of extensions: safe and unsafe
ones. Corollary 32 remains to be true: it is an NP-complete problem to test if systems
S =(; ;  ) with Mod()= ↑⊥ has a safe extension.
The co-NP(3)-completeness result in the previous subsection rests on an analysis of
unsafe extensions given that  is not equivalent to true. We start this section with an
analysis of unsafe extensions for systems S =(; ;  ) where Mod()= ↑⊥.
By the Dichotomy Theorem and Lemma 26, for each member e of the domain D(VS)
of partial truth assignments over the variable set VS associated with system S, there
exists some ❀ ∈, such that e |=  but e |= .
Lemma 36 concludes that for g =⊥, the set ↑g is g-invariant if and only if g is
a maximal element of D(VS), i.e., a classical 0-1 truth assignment. We now establish
conditions under which the set ↑⊥=D(VS) is ⊥-invariant. According to De8nition 35,
↑⊥ is ⊥-invariant if whenever
[D(VS); D(VS)[a← ])
is a power default and D(VS)[a← ] = ∅, then D(VS)[a← ] =D(VS). We therefore have
the following, by examining the conditions under which De8nition 35 apply.
Lemma 50. For systems S =(; ;  ) where Mod()= ↑⊥, we have ↑⊥ is ⊥-invariant
if and only if for all constraints ❀ ∈ such that Mod()= ↑⊥, we have either
Mod()= ↑⊥, or Mod()= ∅.
By checking the de8nition of extensions in the Smyth power domain, Lemma 50
provides a necessary and suTcient condition for D(VS) to be an unsafe extension of
D(VS) under the constraints in . In the unsafe case, when D(VS) is not an extension
of D(VS), then by Lemmas 34, 36, 39, the unsafe extensions of D(VS) are maximal
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elements in D(VS). In the context of Lemma 50, we can state the situation more
precisely as follows.
Lemma 51. For systems S =(; ;  ) where Mod()= ↑⊥, if there exists a constraint
❀ ∈ such that Mod()= ↑⊥, Mod() = ↑⊥, and Mod() = ∅, then E is an unsafe
extensions of  if and only if E= {g} for some maximal partial truth assignment g.
With these preparations in mind, we can state the second main result of this section.
Theorem 52. General SNIP is NP(4)-complete.
Proof. We use the following complete problem for NP(4):
Instance: A quadruple (P;Q; R; S) of classical Boolean formulas.
Property: taut(P)∧ (sat(Q)∨ (sat(R)∧ taut(S))).
Hardness: We transform a quadruple (P;Q; R; S) into an instance of entailment as
follows. Make sure the variables of P, Q, R and S are disjoint. Construct two syntactic
constraints:
 :=
{
true❀ (Q ∨ R) ∧ ∧
i∈I
(xi ∨ ¬xi); true ❀ Q ∧
∧
i∈I
(xi ∨ ¬xi)
}
;
where {xi | i∈ I} is the set of the occurring variables. We show that
true |∼ P ∧ [Q ∨ (R ∧ S)]
if and only if (P;Q; R; S) is a correct instance of the problem above.
Only if: Suppose true |∼ P ∧ [Q∨ (R∧ S)] is valid. Clearly, P must be a tautology
no matter what, because extensions always exist and they are captured by formulas
with variables disjoint from those in P. Either (i) the extension is safe, or (ii) there
are no safe extensions. For (i), we have Q satis8able, and the tuple (P;Q; R; S) is a
correct instance of the problem above. For (ii), we have Q unsatis8able. Since we
cannot have ↑⊥ as an extension here, R must be satis8able. So, S must be a tautology
for true |∼ P ∧ [Q∨ (R∧ S)] to be valid.
If: Suppose (P;Q; R; S) is a valid quadruple. We know that P is a tautology. If
Q is satis8able, then we have a unique safe extension captured by Q, and clearly
true |∼ P ∧ [Q∨ (R∧ S)] is valid. Suppose Q is unsatis8able. Then by assumption R
is satis8able and S a tautology. In this case we have only unsafe extensions, charac-
terized by total truth assignments satisfying R. Once again, we can see that true |∼
P ∧ [Q∨ (R∧ S)] is valid.
(Membership) Note that
co-NP(4) = {L1 ∪ [L2 ∩ (L3 ∪ L4)] |L1; L4 ∈ NP; L2; L3 ∈ co-NP}:
We show that true |∼  is in co-NP(4). Suppose  is not true. Our algorithm succeeds
in one of the following cases:
(1) (NP) either 8nd a safe element satisfying ¬  , or
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(2) (co-NP) it veri8es that no elements are safe, and further checks that
(a) (co-NP) either none of the  is satis8able for true❀ ∈, or
(b) (NP) there exists an element satisfying one of the  and ¬ at the same time.
The above combination of Boolean operators on NP-oracles puts the problem squarely
into the co-NP(4) class, and so SNIP is in NP(4) in this case.
6. Characterizing non-monotonic consequence relation
The Cautious Monotony law is one of the patterns of inference said to form a “core”
collection of rules for any reasonable logical non-monotonic reasoning system. It reads
as
If  |∼  and  |∼ <; then  ∧ < |∼  ;
where now |∼ is some sort of general relation between formulas.
Theorem 53. The Cautious Monotony law holds with |∼ taken to be |∼.
The proof is by the Dichotomy Theorem, analyzing the safe and unsafe cases sepa-
rately.
Theorem 54. With respect to a set  of syntactic constraints, the following set of
laws hold for the skeptical non-monotonic consequence relation of propositional logic.
• Supraclassicality: p6q⇒p❀ q.
• Left Logical Equivalence: (p= q) & (p❀ r)⇒ q❀ r.
• Right Weakening: (p❀ q) & (q6r)⇒p❀ r.
• Cautious Cut: (p❀ q) & (p∧ q❀ r)⇒p❀ r.
• Cautious Monotony: (p❀ q) & (p❀ r)⇒p∧ q❀ r.
• Right And: (p❀ q) & (p❀ r)⇒ (p❀ q∧ r).
• Left Or: (p∨ q)❀ r⇔ (p❀ r)∧ (q❀ r).
• Right Or: p❀ (q∨ r)⇒ (p❀ q)∨ (p❀ r).
As we showed earlier, the Or laws follow from the Extension Splitting Theorem.
We omit the routine proofs for the rest of the items.
7. Concluding remarks
By interpreting default reasoning in the Smyth powerdomain and using Kleene’s
strong three-valued system, we have obtained co-NP(3) and NP(4) completeness re-
sults for propositional default reasoning, a signi8cant improvement (assuming NP =P)
over previous results using di5erent de8nitions. We feel that for experimental purposes,
localizing relevant information before applying the defaults may cut down the com-
plexity further. In general, the domain theoretic approach to non-monotonic reasoning
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makes it possible to prove desirable structural properties which do not hold in the
standard case.
Experimental results on non-monotonic inference with power defaults have in fact
been obtained; see [13] for experiments comparing power default inference to a variety
of other systems. The results show that in some experimental settings, power defaults
work better than standard systems, and in other cases, not as well. It can be concluded
that PDR is competitive with other systems in the experimental settings considered.
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